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imposed to deter like conduct.20 A similar penalty should be sufficient
to insure strict adherence to CR 75.01, without denying a review on
the merits.
As has been stated, the lawyer is supposed to be and must be a
trained technician and must have a sound working knowledge of the
tools of his trade; he must properly use the Rules of Civil Procedure
in order to secure a review of his case by the court.21 However, since
lawyers are susceptible to making mistakes, they and their clients
should not have to bear the burden of dismissal when their mistakes
result in no injustice or prejudice to their adversaries.
William A. Logan
CRIUMNAL PROCEDURE-SEARCH AND SEimE-AmissIriarr OF EvDRNcE
OBTAINED IN SEARC INCIDENTAL TO ARREsT WrmoTJ A WARRANT.
Defendant was arrested for drunken driving. He was arrested without
a warrant after officers noticed his car being driven in an erratic man-
ner. Upon searching the car, the arresting officers found a pistol con-
cealed under a coat on the front seat. Defendant was taken to jail
and one of the officers swore out a warrant for drunken driving.
While this charge was pending, defendant was indicted and tried
for carrying concealed a deadly weapon. Defendant made a timely
motion to suppress all evidence obtained in the search of the auto-
mobile, claiming that the evidence was incompetent because the pri-
mary question of his guilt or innocence of the drunken driving charge
had never been determined. The trial court overruled the motion
and admitted the evidence. The jury were instructed that if they
believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated
his automobile while under the influence of intoxicating beverages
in the presence of the arresting officers, and if they further believed
that he carried concealed a deadly weapon, they would find him
guilty. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and defendant appealed
from a judgment entered thereon. Held: The trial court erred in
admitting the evidence and the judgment of conviction was re-
versed. "Where an original and separate charge based on the of-
fense for which the accused was arrested is pending in a court and
subsequently the accused is charged in another court of a separate
offense, no evidence which was obtained solely as a result of a search
2 0 CR 75.05, supra note 14.
21 See Clay, "The Use and Abuse of the Rules of Civil Procedure," 47 Ky.
L.J. 161 passim (1959).
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made after the arrest for the initial charge is admissible in the trial
of the second offense until the offender is found guilty in the first
court."' [Emphasis added.] Thomason v. Commonwealth, 822 S.W.2d
104 (Ky. 1959).
Kentucky has long held that evidence obtained in an unlawful
search is inadmissible as evidence in a criminal prosecution.2 The
obvious policy behind this is to protect the public against the un-
reasonable searches and seizures prohibited by section 10 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution.3 Only a minority of jurisdictions, however, feel
that such a rule is necessary to implement the prohibition against
unreasonable searches.
4
Kentucky also holds that an arrest for a misdemeanor is unlawful
if made without a warrant and the accused is later found not guilty.5
The basis of this holding is section 86 of the Kentucky Criminal
Code which provides that a police officer may arrest without a war-
rant "when a public offense is committed in his presence, or when
he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has
committed a felony." The Kentucky court is clearly correct in its
interpretation of this section. Under it an officer is allowed to arrest
for misdemeanors only when the "offense is committed in his pres-
ence," not when he has "reasonable grounds to believe" that such
an offense is being committed. Thus, any arrest without a warrant
for a misdemeanor not actually committed in the officers presence
is an unlawful arrest. A search incidental to an unlawful arrest is
an illegal search and evidence obtained thereby is inadmissible.6
The final determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of the
misdemeanor for which he was arrested is conclusive as to whether
there was an offense committed in the officer's presence7
Since a verdict of not guilty is conclusive evidence that no mis-
demeanor was committed in the officer's presence, and since many
persons are arrested for misdemeanors without warrants and 'never
convicted, unlawful arrests are frequent. In order to protect an officer
from irresponsible jury action or other uncertainties of the law, the
Court of Appeals has refused to impose civil liability for such an
lThomason v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Ky. 1959).
2 See Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920). See
also Miller v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 825, 32 S.W.2d 416 (1980); Walters v.
Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 182, 250 S.W. 839 (1923); Ash v. Commonwealth, 193
Ky. 452, 236 S.W. 1032 (1922).
3 See Youman v. Commonwealth, supra note 2.
4 Moreland, Modem Criminal Procedure 130 (1959).
5 Parrott v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1956).
6 See Parrott v. Commonwealth, supra note 5; Billings v. Commonwealth, 223
Ky. 381, -3 S.W.2d 770 (1928).
7Thomason v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1959); Parrott v.
Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1956).
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unlawful arrest if the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that
an offense was being committed in his presence.8 Thus, although
many arrests are unlawful, there is adequate protection for the of-
ficer and there is seldom any civil liability. The effect, insofar as the
officer is concerned, is the same as if he were permitted to arrest
when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a misdemeanor is
being committed in his presence.
The result is not the same, however, for the person arrested. If
there is a verdict of not guilty, the arrest was unlawful and any
evidence obtained thereby is rendered inadmissible, regardless of
the kind of evidence seized, and regardless of the seriousness of the
crime committed.9
The instant case is an extension of the Kentucky law on the
inadmissibility of such evidence. Heretofore the court has held that if
the defendant has been found not guilty of the preliminary offense,
the arrest was conclusively unlawful, and any evidence obtained
through the arrest is inadmissible in a subsequent trial on a separate
offense.' 0 Also, if there was no charge pending on the offense for
which the arrest was made, the court in a trial on the separate offense
must submit the question of guilt or innocence of the preliminary
offense to the jury."' If the jury believed the defendant guilty of the
preliminary offense, then they could consider the evidence obtained in
determining whether he was guilty of the separate offense. The
present case is a corollary of the latter rule. If the preliminary charge
is pending, there can be no admission of the evidence obtained in
the search incidental to an arrest on the preliminary charge unless
and until the defendant is convicted of the preliminary charge.
Although the principal case is unquestionably a logical exten-
tion of precedent, it might be questionable on the basis of overall
public policy. Refusing to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful
search is the only practical protection that the public can have against
unreasonable intrusions by officers. The constitution prohibits un-
reasonable searches and seizures, however, not unlawful searches and
seizures.' 2 A search made incidental to an unlawful arrest is not
necessarily unreasonable. The question of reasonableness is not en-
tirely dependent upon the legality of the arrest. A search made inci-
8See Sizemore v: Hoskins, 314 Ky. 436, 235 S.W.2d 1011 (1951); Coins
v. Hudson, 246 Ky. 517, 55 S.W. 388 (1932).
9 See Parrott v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1956).
10 Ibid.
11 Gossett v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 729, 215 S.W.2d 279 (1948); Barnes
v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 481, 204 S.W.2d 801 (1947); Billings v. Common-
wealth, 223 Ky. 381, 3 S.W.2d 770 (1928).
12 Ky. Const. § 10 provides in part: 'The people shall be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure... "
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dental to an arrest without a warrant upon reasonable grounds may
well be a reasonable search even though no offense was in fact
committed in the officer's presence.
Neither the Kentucky Constitution nor the Kentucky Criminal
Code explicitly require the result reached in the instant case.13 Here
there may not have been an unreasonable search. The fact that the
defendant had not been tried on a preliminary charge of drunken driv-
ing might raise a presumption that the arrest was illegal until a con-
viction was had. Even if this presumption should arise, there is no
need to conclusively presume that the search incidental to the arrest
was an unreasonable search.
The admission of evidence procured in a search incidental to an
arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant should not depend upon
the defendant's being convicted of the offense for which he was
arrested. Such a rule may needlessly permit many criminals to escape
prosecution for serious felonies if they can obtain an acquittal
or dismissal of the preliminary charge. The question should be one
of the reasonableness of the search, as required by the constitution.
This would provide an accused adequate protection, and there is no
need for the Kentucky court to afford him a broader basis for
protection by equating unreasonable searches with searches inci-
dental to unlawful arrests.
Carl R. Clontz
DEDICATION OF STEETs-PEscmIroN-IGRTs OF ABUTTING PRoPERTY
OwNm-s-Martha Salyers and Marshall Tackett bought lots in a
platted subdivision on opposite sides of a street dedicated to the
public use by the subdivider in 1920. The street was outlined by
plowed furrows at the time of the dedication and had since grown
up in weeds and been used as pasture; it had never been used by
the public nor accepted by the town as a city street." Tackett erected
a building near the dead end of the street, fenced the street in, and
used it in connection with his adjoining land for cultivation and
pasture. In a suit by Salyers seeking an injunction to compel re-
13 "The constitutional provision does not undertake to define what consti-
tutes an unreasonable search and seizure, but it is judicially settled that all illegal
searches are 'unreasonable'." [Emphasis added.] Manning v. Commonwealth,
328 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Ky. 1959).
'The opinion suggests that the street in question was a city street, but
appellee's petition for rehearing and the court's application of the "County" section
of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.050 (see note 23, infra) make it obvious the street was
outside the city limits.
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